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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
PROSECUTION OF GENDER-BASED
CRIMES—THE SPECIAL COURT FOR
SIERRA LEONE EXPERIENCE
REMARKS BY HON. TERESA DOHERTY,
JUSTICE OF THE SPECIAL COURT OF SIERRA LEONE*
The Special Court for Sierra Leone was set up following a request by the
Government of Sierra Leone to the United Nations after a civil war that
raged in that small West African country for ten years.1 The war was noted
for the brutality of the atrocities visited upon civilians, killing by beating
and burning, the deliberate chopping off of arms, hands, and legs, the
abduction of people for forced labor, as sex slaves, and as child soldiers,
pregnant women cut open to settle bets about the sex of their babies, and
the deliberate destruction of homes, villages, and cities.2
The Special Court for Sierra Leone is noted for several landmark
decisions in International Law, including the decision on the immunity of a

*

The views in this paper are entirely those of the writer and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Special Court for Sierra Leone or Trial Chamber II. Hon
Justice T.A. Doherty, C.B.E., is from Northern Ireland. Before studying law in Belfast,
she worked as a civil servant and as a volunteer in Zambia, and worked in legal aid
clinics in “no go areas” of Belfast as a student in early 1970. She worked in Papua
New Guinea from 1976-1987, first in the Public Solicitor’s (public defense) office and
as provincial legal officer for Morobe Province. While Provincial legal officer she
continued to do legal aid work and made several Constitutional rights challenges in the
courts. She was the first woman to be elected as a councilor of the Papua New Guinea
Law Society. She was appointed as the Principal Magistrate for the Momase region of
Papua New Guinea in 1987 and as National and later Supreme Court judge in 1988, the
first woman to hold any high judicial office in the South Pacific Islands Region She
was appointed a judge of the High Court and Court of Appeal of Sierra Leone in 2003.
She was appointed by United Nations in Jan 2005 as a judge of the Special Court of
Sierra Leone and is the presiding judge of Trial Chamber II. She is a commissioner for
Life Sentence Review Commission for Northern Ireland, part time chairman of Appeal
Services, member of the Commonwealth Reference Group for the promotion of the
Rights of Women and the Girl Child and has worked on consultancies in various
countries in Africa and Asia.
1. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone
on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178
U.N.T.S. 138 [hereinafter Agreement on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra
Leone].
2. See Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A,
Appeals Judgment (Feb. 22, 2008); Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No.
SCSL-2004-16-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, (June 20, 2007).
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Head of State,3 on the application of amnesties in peace treaties to crimes
against humanity and war crimes,4 and the recruitment and use of children
in war (commonly referred to as child soldiers).5 My emphasis in this
Paper will be on the decisions relating to sexual slavery and forced
marriage.
The Statute6 setting up the Court was charged to prosecute persons who
bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international
humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law since November 30, 1996. The
Statute provided that the court would have power to prosecute crimes
against humanity and, for the first time, sexual slavery was specified as a
crime against humanity at Article 2(g).7 As a hybrid court, the Statute of
the court also incorporated domestic law of Sierra Leone. This included,
inter alia, offences relating to the abuse of girls pursuant to the Prevention
of Cruelty to Children Act 1926 (CAP.31). No persons were charged under
this Sierra Leonean Law.
THE INDICTMENTS
A total of thirteen indictments were proferred against thirteen men and of
these the indictments against the nine individuals associated, variously,
with the Civil Defence Force, Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, and
Revolutionary United Front were presented at the same time. These were
later consolidated into three cases and were commonly referred to as the
CDF, the ARFC, and the RUF trials. The AFRC indictees, Brima, Kamara,
and Kanu, were arraigned on various dates, prior to the consolidation,
between March and September 2003.
The initial charges brought by the Prosecution against the individuals
who were later to be tried in the AFRC and RUF cases included allegations
of sexual violence. In contrast, the Prosecution included no charges of
sexual violence whatsoever in its initial indictments against the three
individuals who would later be tried together in the CDF case. I do not
know the reasons for this.
In February 2004, the Prosecution sought leave to amend its Indictments
to, inter alia, “add one more and new count of forced marriage,” a crime
against humanity in all three consolidated cases. Two of the indictments
already included charges of sexual violence while one, the CDF, did not.
In seeking to add the forced marriage charges to the two cases that already
3. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-I-059, Decision on Immunity
from Jurisdiction (May 31, 2004).
4. See Prosecutor v. Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-AR72(E), Decision on
Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction/Abuse of Process: Amnesty
Provided by the Lomé Accord (May 25, 2004).
5. Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-04-14-AR72(E), Decision on
Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment) (May 31,
2004).
6. Statue of the Special Court of Sierra Leona, app. of Agreement on the
Establishment of a Special Court of Sierra Leone, supra note 1, 2178 U.N.T.S. at 145.
7. Statute of the Special Court, supra note 6, art. 1.
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included other allegations of sexual violence, the Prosecution argued that
the additional charge they were seeking to enter—forced marriage—was
based on the “exact same factual context” pleaded in earlier indictments
and therefore that the Defence would not need to undertake further
investigations to contest this new count in the indictment. The Defence
objected arguing forced marriage was not a crime against humanity and
such a charge violated the principles of legality.8 After a lengthy review of
the principles, in particular “the crucial consideration” of “timing and
whether the application for the amendment is brought at the stage in the
proceedings where it would not prejudice the rights of the accused,” the
Trial Chamber by a majority allowed the Prosecution to amend its
indictments in the two cases, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and
the Revolutionary United Front, to include charges of forced marriage. The
Trial Chamber also held that forced marriage was a “kindred offence” to
those that existed in consolidated indictment9 and referred to “the necessity
for international criminal justice to highlight the high profile nature of the
emerging domain of gender offences with a view to bringing the alleged
perpetrators to justice.”10
In its decision in the Civil Defense Forces case, the majority of the Trial
Chamber considered the impact of adding an entirely new set of charges,
involving a completely new set of facts, on the rights of the accused to be
tried without undue delay and held that allowing the Prosecution to add
new facts and counts at such a late date would have delayed the start of
tria1.11
In his minority opinion, Justice Boutet referred to the Special Court’s
own Rules, the reluctance of victims of sexual violence to come forward
and report such actions, the reports of the International Committee of the
Red Cross, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of the systematic rape,
sexual slavery, and slavery—like practices during periods of armed
conflicts and the rulings of the other ad hoc Tribunals in support of his
opinion that leave to amend the indictment should be granted.12
It appears that the Trial Chamber in the recent case of Prosecutor v.
Lukić at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
when asked to amend an indictment to add new charges of rape,
enslavement and torture was faced with a similar dilemma to that of the
judges in the CDF case.13
8. Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-PT, Decision on
Prosecution Request for Leave to Amend the Indictment, ¶¶ 6, 12, 88 (May 6, 2004).
9. Id. ¶¶ 46, 52.
10. Id. ¶ 34.
11. Prosecutor v. Norman, Fofana & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-PT,
Decision on Prosecution Request for Leave to Amend the Indictment (May 20, 2004).
12. See Prosecutor v. Normam, Fofana, & Kondewa, Case No. SCSL-04-14-T,
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Pierre Boutet on the Decision on Prosecution Request for
Leave to Amend the Indictment, ¶¶ 26-34 (May 31, 2004).
13. See Prosecutor v. Lukić & Lukić, Case No. IT-98-32/1-PT, Decision on Motion
Seeking Leave to Amend the Second Amended Indictment (July 8, 2008).
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Balancing the rights of the various parties is a discretionary matter, and,
possibly other chambers may have lent more weight to the Prosecution’s
explanations for the delays in bringing charges of sexual violence in the
CDF trial. However, the rights of the accused to a trial without undue
delay is clearly articulated in the Special Court Statute as well as numerous
human rights instruments that preceded it. In my view the sexual nature of
the new charges had nothing to do with the CDF and Lukić trial decisions
to deny the Prosecution applications to amend the impugned indictments,
the same principles would have applied equally to any criminal charge.
THE DECISIONS
Trial Chamber II, of which I was a judge, heard and ruled on the
evidence in Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu (the AFRC trial). That
decision considered, for the first time, the international criminal law
relating to child soldiers, forced marriage and sexual slavery. For the
purposes of this paper I look at forced marriage and sexual slavery.
FORCED MARRIAGE
In the course of the civil war two rebel groups, the Revolutionary United
Front and the Armed Forced Revolutionary Council regularly abducted
civilians and used them for forced labor such as mining, domestic work,
and carrying of loads, and women and girls for sexual purposes.
Those women and girls who were forcefully abducted from their homes
were taken back to the rebel camps and fighters could select those women
and girls they wanted as wives. Commanders got the first choice. Very
young girls were sometimes allocated to young SBU (small boy unit)
fighters. A bureaucratic system of registering the names and allocation of
these women was instituted in some camps and fighters were obliged to
sign for the women or girls allocated to them as wives. The captors
sometimes kept those women or girls they captured themselves. The
woman was told she was the wife of the captor or fighter. She was given
no choice in the matter.
Both the Prosecution and Defense adduced expert evidence. The expert
evidence by both parties showed that customary arranged marriage was and
still is, a common phenomena in the rural areas throughout West Africa;
less so in the urban areas. Girls were and are frequently married or had
marriages arranged when they were quite young and got little say in who
they would marry. Whilst the Muslim religion (the majority religious
group in Sierra Leone) did not allow for women being married without
their consent, it was apparent from the expert evidence that many girls were
and are obliged for the good of the clan or the community to conform with
the choice made by their elders. There was consent, albeit a reluctant
consent or one that was made for the good of the community, rather than
for the good of the individual. The vital element is the consent of the
families of the prospective spouses.
The majority of the Trial Chamber in the AFRC trial, having heard the
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evidence decided that the facts were not a basis for a separate crime of “so
called forced marriage” but that it was subsumed into the crime of sexual
slavery. Sexual slavery is a separate crime provided for in Article 2(g) of
the Statute of the Special Court as a Crime against Humanity.
I dissented from the majority view. The evidence showed that women
and girls who were made into wives had a conjugal status forced upon
them. They were immediately stigmatized as “bush wives” or “rebel
wives” they were considered “tainted” by “rebel blood” and were refused
re-entry into their village communities or their family homes. Their
children were stigmatized and, as one expert described it, were running
naked without an education or future. The women were obliged to care for
and carry the “husband’s” possessions, clean, cook and be loyal, and
provide sex when and as the “husband” wanted. They had children and
often suffered miscarriages; diseases and HIV/Aids were common. Any
transgressions were severely punished and a “husband” who tired of his
wife could replace her and might send her to the front line as a fighter.
However, being a wife of a fighter brought with it certain protections. The
wife was protected from rape by other men, given food when food was
available and depending on the status of the “husband” had a corresponding
status; to the extent that evidence showed that some wives of commanders
were responsible for the distribution of looted goods.
The label “wife” to a rebel caused mental trauma, stigmatized the
victims and negatively impacted on their ability to re-integrate into the
communities.
In approaching the evidence and the submissions of the parties I looked
to the international customary law and internationally recognized norms
and standards because, as stated by Professor Werle:
As part of the international order, international criminal law originated
from the same legal sources as international law. These include
international treaties, customary international law, and general principles
of law recognized by the world’s major legal systems. Decisions of
international courts and international legal doctrine can be used not as
sources of law, but subsidiary means for determining the law. Decisions
of national courts which apply international law can also be referred to
14
here.

This led to taking account of the Penal Laws of other countries in
Islamic, Christian, Hindu, Common Law, and Civil Law systems.
However, more importantly the International Treaties and Conventions
were applied; in particular the International Covenants such as the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)
which Sierra Leone signed on September 21, 1988 and ratified in
November 1988.
However, it was also relevant in the circumstances and facts of the case
14. GERHARD WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 44-45 (2005).
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to look particularly at the African Charters and Conventions such as the
African (Banjul) Charter on Human and People’s Rights and the protocols
to the African Charter on the Rights of Women in Africa both of which had
been signed (but not implemented by Sierra Leone). On the basis of those
conventions and on the evidence, I held that
international treaties and domestic law provide that a marriage is a
relationship founded on the mutual consent of both spouses. In forced
marriage the consent of the victim is absent. In the absence of such
consent, the victim is forced into a relationship of a conjugal nature with
the perpetrator thereby subsuming the victim’s will and undermining the
victim’s exercise of their rights to self determination.

Further that forced marriage did not necessarily involve elements of
physical violence such as abduction, enslavement or rape and the fact that
many women accepted their lot and remained with their “husbands”
because they had no other choice did not transform a forced marriage into a
consensual situation and did not retro-actively negate the original
criminality of the act.
The Prosecution appealed the Majority Decision and the Appeal
Chamber reviewed the evidence and the majority and minority opinions.
The Appeal Chamber noted that “the Prosecution may have misled the
Trial Chamber by the manner in which forced marriage appeared to have
been classified in the Indictment. The Indictment classifies Count 8 “Other
Inhumane Acts” along with Counts 6, 7, and 9 under the heading “Sexual
Violence.” This categorization of forced marriages explains, but does not
justify, the classification by the Trial Chamber of forced marriage as
“sexual violence.”
After reviewing the history of “other inhumane acts” in International
Criminal Law first introduced in the Nuremburg Charter, the Appeal
Chamber held that the category “other inhumane acts” was intended to be a
residual provision so as to punish criminal acts not specifically recognized
as crimes against humanity but which, in context, are of comparable gravity
to the listed crimes against humanity.”
After considering the evidence and the law, the Appeal Chamber held
that the perpetrator intended to impose a forced conjugal association rather
than exercise mere ownership over civilian women and girls. They adopted
the view in the dissenting opinion that forced marriage involves “the
imposition, by threat or physical force arising from the perpetrator’s words
or other conduct, of a forced conjugal association by the perpetrator over
the victims.” And
[v]ictims were subjected to mental trauma by being labelled as rebel
“wives”; further they were stigmatised and found it difficult to integrate
into their communities . . . causing mental and moral suffering, which in
the context of the Sierra Leone conflict, is of comparable seriousness to
other crimes against humanity listed in the Statute.15
15

Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Appeals
Judgment, ¶ 193 (Feb. 22, 2008).
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The Appeal Chamber then considered whether forced marriage satisfies
the elements of “other inhumane acts” and held that other inhumane acts
contained in Article 2(i) of the Statute forms part of Customary
International Law:
serves as a residual category designed to punish acts or omissions not
specifically listed as crimes against humanity provided these acts or
omissions meet the following requirements:
Inflict great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or
physical health;
Are sufficiently similar in gravity to the acts referred to in Article
2(a) to Article 2(h) of the Statute; and
The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that
established the character of the gravity of the act.
The acts must also satisfy the general chapeau requirements of
crimes against humanity.

The Appeal Chamber stated that it was “firmly of the view that acts of
forced marriage were of similar gravity to several enumerated crimes
against humanity including enslavement, imprisonment, torture, rape,
sexual slavery and sexual violence.”
SEXUAL SLAVERY
Statute Article 2(g) empowers the Special Court to prosecute persons
who committed the crime of sexual slavery as part of a widespread or
systematic attack against any civilian population. The crime of sexual
slavery was described in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia in the Kunarac case. The Statute of International Criminal
Court, Art 7 (1)g-2, defined the crime of sexual slavery as:
The perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the right
ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling,
lending or bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them a
similar deprivation of liberty.
The perpetrator caused such person or persons to engage in one or more
acts of a sexual nature.
The perpetrator committed such conduct intending to engage in the act of
sexual slavery or in the reasonable knowledge that it was likely to occur.

We adopted that definition and held:
The powers of ownership listed in the first element of sexual slavery are
non- exhaustive. There is no requirement for any payment or exchange
in order to establish the exercise of ownership. Deprivation of liberty
may include extracting forced labour or otherwise reducing a person to
servile status. Further, ownership, as indicated by possession, does not
require confinement to a particular place but may include situations in
which those who are captured remain in the control of their captors
because they have no where else to go and fear for their lives. The
consent or free will of the victim is absent under conditions of
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enslavement.

16

The facts showed that the women and girls forcefully abducted from
their homes and communities by rebels were taken back to the rebel bases
and forcefully marched from one base to another as the rebels moved
through Sierra Leone. Some of the women and girls were sent for training
in military tactics and fighting and sent to the front line, some as described,
were forced into marriage and may not have been obliged to fight. Those
women and girls who were not “wives” were available to all and any
fighter as sexual objects. They were frequently raped and frequently gangraped, they had no right to resist and could not escape.
They were obliged to perform domestic duties including cooking,
laundering, and food finding. Food finding involved looting food from
villages and farms as well as looking for food in the bush. Resistance or
attempts to escape were met with severe punishment and, particularly in
cases of attempted escape, with death.
Evidence was adduced of women being locked in rice boxes, wooden
boxes used for storing food, and/or being lashed. The descriptions of the
forced marches when women were pregnant, sick, and in one case giving
birth to triplets, showed very severe maltreatment as part of the slavery and
sexual slavery of these women.
All three of the Accused in the AFRC trial were convicted of sexual
slavery, however, not as originally indicted. Count 7 of the Indictment
which charged the defendants with “sexual slavery and other forms of
sexual violence” was dismissed by the majority of the Trial Chamber as
offending the Rule against duplicity. The majority ruled that “Count 7 is
bad for duplicity and is accordingly dismissed in its entirety.”
I disagreed with the majority in this procedural ruling and held for
reasons detailed in the judgment that part of the Count which charged the
defendants with “other forms of sexual violence” should have been severed
and the evidence relating to sexual slavery only considered.
The appeal by the Prosecution against the majority ruling was upheld by
the Appeals Chamber which held the Count should have been severed.
In a May 11, 2007 article, Louise Arbour, then the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, when writing about the plight of the
victims of sexual attacks during conflicts stated that:
The Special Court for Sierra Leone has made strides in addressing such
hindrances in the face of a monumental task; as the result of ten years of
conflict and the belligerents’ methods of warfare in that country, the
brutality of sexual violence was extraordinary, and its victims were to be
counted in the thousands.17

16. Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamaru & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Judgment,
¶ 709 (June 20, 2007).
17

Louise Arbour, War Crimes Against Women Go on with Impunity, TORONTO
STAR, May 11, 2007, at A15.
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